紐約遊學-自助家遊學網

          論中共之戰術性核武 論中共之戰術性核武 On China’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons 鄭大誠 Ta-chen Cheng 摘要 Abstract 中共的戰術性核子武器雖然較少為外界所討論，不過卻是共軍長久以來持續發展的重要項目之一。本文認為，雖然中共當局一直提出所謂「不首先使用核武」的承諾，不過從一開始發展起，中共就已經準備將戰術性核武投入大規模常規性的武力衝突中。換言之，中共的戰術性核武不僅可用在核反擊，也不受「不首先使用核武」的限制。也因為此種特性，中共官方對於其戰術性核武的使用與部署總是刻意不談或隱瞞。 中共現約擁有150枚戰術性核武。中共曾有過的戰術性核武至少應包括低當量的原子榴彈炮、爆破地雷、多管火箭系統，以及中、短程核飛彈等等。目前則以中、短程戰術巡弋或彈道飛彈為主。本文認為，中共不僅會把戰術性核武具體地用來嚇阻周邊強權對於其重大國家利益的干預，如果有必要，這些核武也可能會被用在未來的對台軍事行動中。 Although tactical nuclear weapons have been an important concern in China’s military development, they are rarely mentioned by the outside world. In this article, the author argues, despite the consistent commitment of the No-First Use of nuclear weapons by the Chinese government, China has actually been prepared to deploy and employ its tactical nuclear weapons in large-scale conventional military conflicts. In other words, China’s tactical nuclear weapons are not confined to the use of nuclear retaliation. They, in fact, can be used first. Thanks to such sensitive nature, the Chinese government has always been ambiguous on the use of its tactical nuclear weapons. The Chinese currently possess 150 tactical nuclear weapons. In retrospect, China’s tactical nuclear arsenal should at least include low-kiloton atomic artillery shells, demolition mines, multiple-rocket system and medium/short range missiles. Medium/ short range nuclear capable cruise or ballistic missiles are now China’s major tactical nuclear deterrent. These weapons, the author argues, could be used not only against the military interference of China’s vital national interests by other military powers in this area, but also in the future military operations against Taiwan, if necessary. 前言 Foreword 若較諸備受囑目的戰略性核子武器，中共的戰術性核子武器的確較少為外界所討論。這不但是因為相關資料不易獲得，更也許是因為中共刻意隱瞞的結果。不過，不可否認地，戰術性核武一直是中共所戮力發展的重要核威懾能量項目。雖然中共從未正式對戰術性核武的範疇給予一明白定義（他們可能也不願意這麼做），不過一般觀察家咸信，中共曾有過的戰術性核武至少應包括低當量的原子榴彈炮、爆破地雷、多管火箭系統，以及中、短程核飛彈等等。中共目前約有150枚戰術性核武，其不僅將會具體地用來嚇阻周邊強權對於中共重大國家利益的干預，如果有必要，戰術性核武也極可能會被用在未來的對台軍事行動中。也因為如此，中共長久以來宣稱的「不首先使用核武」承諾可能在本質上根本就不適用於戰術性核武的使用上。 There have been fewer discussions on the issues of China’s tactical nuclear wea 房地產pons, compared with those of strategic nuclear weapons. This may be caused by not only the scarcity of relevant material, but also China’s intentional concealment. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that tactical nuclear weapons have been an important branch of China’s nuclear deterrent. It is not easy to offer a clear definition on tactical nuclear weapons in the Chinese term as Beijing never bothered to do so. However, according to some observations, such weapons should at least include low-kiloton atomic artillery shells, demolition mines, multiple-rocket system (MRS) as well as medium/short range missiles. China currently possesses 150 tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons could be used not only against the military interference of China’s vital national interests by other military powers in this area, but also in the future military operations against Taiwan, if necessary. In that case, China’s commitment of No-First-Use (NFU) very likely does not apply to the use of its tactical nuclear weapons. 早期發展 Early development 在1950年代，中共多數的戰略專家認為，所謂「戰略性」與「戰術性」核武的分野是不切實際且沒有意義的。就如同前蘇聯的觀點一樣，[1] 他們認為核子戰爭是不可能被控制的，戰術性核武的使用只會增加核升級的危險。這個看法可以用中共官方媒體新華社在1955年的一篇報導來說明。該報導引用一位核物理學家的論述指稱，即使所謂的戰術性核武能夠被「戰術地」妥善使用，但戰術性核武仍舊是一種大規模毀滅性武器。只要一經使用，大規模且無區分的破壞就無法加以避免與控制。[2] 雖然如此，自1961年起，中共卻漸漸展露出對發展戰術性核武的興趣，其對於核升級、核戰爭的看法也有所改變。同時在技術上，中共科學家們也開始研究改良並縮小核子裝置。[3] In the 1950s, the division of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons incurred doubts and criticism by the Chinese strategists, who, like the Russians, believed that a controlled nuclear war was unrealistic and linked them to a danger of escalation. For example, in 1955, China’s governmental media New China News Agency quoted a nuclear physicist that even if nuclear weapons could be used “tactically”, they were still Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and their large-scale and indiscriminate damage could not be prevented. From 1961, however, the Chinese began to express their interest in developing a tactical nuclear capability. China also noticed the possibility of modifying nuclear devices into a smaller and accurate design. 中共發展戰術性核武究竟是為了什麼目的呢？在冷戰時期，中共的戰術性核武很可能是用來支援其傳統戰力之不足。[4] 特別是在中蘇關係明顯惡化後，當中共明白其傳統兵力將難以阻擋大規模南侵的蘇聯裝甲部隊時，為避免戰情無法收拾，戰術性核武的使用可能就是一種不得不採用的選項。[5] 雖然中共官方自1964年10月16日首次試爆原子彈（實為粗糙之原子裝置）後均一再公開宣稱不首先使用核武，中蘇1969年的邊境衝突乃至於當年 長灘島底的珍寶島危機，或許是中共領導人首次被迫必須考慮使用戰術性核武的時機。當然，此時中共的戰術性核武還是相當簡陋且不足的。最多僅可能包括有原子榴彈炮、爆破地雷或其他小型核子爆破裝置，中共當時也沒有戰術性核飛彈。[6] 據推測，在運用上，中共很可能會利用原子爆破地雷來截斷山路以阻擋大規模入侵之蘇聯地面部隊。 What did the Chinese expect from tactical nuclear weapons? During the Cold War, tactical nuclear weapons were said to support conventional forces. More specifically, as the Chinese recognized it would be difficult to stop a Soviet invasion by conventional means, the only choice open to China was probably to use its tactical nuclear weapons before it was too late. Despite China’s NFU pledge from 1964, the Sino-Soviet border crisis during the late 1960s was the first time that the Chinese were motivated to use their rudimentary tactical nuclear weapons, which perhaps included atomic artillery shells, demolition mines and some nuclear explosives, but not missiles. Atomic demolition munitions (ADMs), for example, could be used by the PLA to close mountain passes and otherwise hamper invading troops. 雖然中共已準備使用戰術性核武來阻擋蘇軍，不過其卻也預估蘇聯可能會在中蘇衝突中先行使用戰術性核武，[7] 因為蘇聯早已在中蘇邊界附近部署了數百枚此類武器。[8] 中共軍事科學院所編教材中的一篇文章曾經指出，敵人（蘇軍）在對中共堅固陣地防禦攻擊中，可能在師的攻擊地區使用10至18枚戰術性核彈。具體計畫是，攻擊中需要由師摧毀的目標約40個，其中以核武摧毀的約16個，佔40％；以航空兵摧毀的約10個，佔25％；以炮兵摧毀的約14個，佔35％。以核武的任務分配來看，共約需戰術性核彈10餘枚。[9] 這篇極罕見的內部參考文獻還推測，為縮小核突擊的安全距離與節省核裝料，敵人對中共最前線陣地上的目標可能以超小型或小型戰術性核彈實施密集突擊，或以中型核彈進行重點突擊，以突擊中共的防禦陣地。對防線後方的炮兵群、指揮所與預備隊的集結地帶，也可能以中型核彈進行突擊。[10] The Chinese, however, anticipated that the Russians would use tactical nuclear weapons first, as the USSR had deployed hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons near the border. In an unusual article from China’s Academy of Military Sciences, the authors assumed an enemy’s (Soviet) mobilized division would be assigned to destroy 40 Chinese targets. 40 per cent of the targets (16 targets) would be attacked by 10-18 nuclear bombs with 25 per cent (10 targets) by air bombing and 35 per cent (14 targets) by artillery. The authors also assumed that the enemy would use low yield atomic bombs to break the front line and higher yield bombs to destroy China’s artillery forces, command centers and reinforcements. 在1969年的邊境危機結束後，中、蘇間的核對峙並未停息。中共沿邊界大幅增加了許多當量低於3萬噸的戰術性核武。[11] 部份強五攻擊機與轟六轟炸機也配掛了核重力空投彈，以應戰爭之需。[12] 不過一直到1970年代結束，中共似乎尚未具備戰術性核飛彈的作戰能力。[13] 不可諱言地，戰術性核武 酒店打工固然提供了中共相當的軍事運用價值，不過使用戰術性核武也可能會給中共帶來一些明顯的政治問題。由於中共發展戰術性核武的目的原本就是要用來抵擋蘇聯傳統兵力的大規模入侵。如果蘇聯部隊在沒有首先使用核武的情況下，中共率先使用了戰術性核武，便會抵觸後者長久以來所對外宣稱的「不首先使用核武」原則。或許是因為此種顧慮，故中共一直對其戰術性核武三緘其口，更遑論公開提及其用途與部署了。 After the end of the 1969 crisis, the Chinese increased the number of their tactical nuclear weapons with a yield below 30 kilotons along the border. The Q-5 attackers and H-6 bombers could also be armed with low yield gravity bombs. Until the end of 1970s, however, China seemed to lack an operational capability of tactical nuclear missiles. Despite the military function, the use of tactical nuclear weapons could produce political problems for the Chinese. If the Russians did not use tactical nuclear weapons first, and the Chinese were forced to use theirs to stop a massive Russian land invasion, this would have contradicted China’s NFU policy, which had been regarded as the core of Chinese nuclear strategy. This could perhaps be an important reason why the Chinese often downplayed their tactical nuclear weapons in military operations. 中共的原子爆破地雷、原子榴彈炮、多管火箭系統乃至於戰術性核飛彈的研製計畫在1980年代初期獲得了進一步的發展。當時一些核試爆的目的也都在測試低於2萬噸當量核裝置的有效性。[14] 除此之外，當時的二炮司令員李旭閣中將還特別要求二炮部隊必須增加戰術性核武的相關演習以便更能熟練其運用。[15] 在兵力部署上，中共國防部副部長肖克在1982年5月曾告知一個法國的訪問團，中共並未在解放軍師級以下單位部署戰術性核武，但他卻未對師級以上單位是否部署加以評論。[16] 肖克的談話不但再次證實了中共的確已擁有並部署了戰術性核武，更說明了中共的戰術性核武乃由高司單位所控管。也許亦如同戰略性核武一般，戰時將接受中央軍委會的直接管制。在同年的一場演習中，解放軍地面部隊與二炮部隊模擬以戰術性核爆炸裝置成功地驅逐了蘇聯裝甲部隊的入侵。《寧夏日報》曾報導說：「我（共）軍的核打擊部隊迅速鎖定了目標，以突襲方式一舉成功打擊了敵人的炮兵陣地與預備部隊。這場演練象徵了我（共）軍在現代條件下系統化訓練的有效實現。」[17] 1982年的這場演習也是外界所知，中共首次承認將戰術性核武列入部隊演習的項目。1988年，中共又測試了1枚1,000至5,000噸當量且強化輻射的小型核裝置。[18] 經由這次試驗，據信中共在研製中子彈的過程中又增進了一大步（中共後來宣稱此裝置為中子彈）。 China’s ADMs, nuclear artillery, MRSs and, more importantly, tactical nuclear missiles were further developed from the early 1980s. Several nuclear tests had produced yields estimated to be below 20 kilotons, and more exercises of tactical nuclear weapons were demanded by then Second Artillery Chief Commander Lieutenant General Li Xuge. In May 1982, Deputy Defense Minister Xiao Ke told a French delegation that China did not have tactical nuclear weapons assigned at the army divisional level, but refused to com 找房子ment on higher echelons. Xiao’s comments not only confirmed the fact that the Chinese had owned tactical nuclear weapons, but also implied that such weapons would be under a higher supervision, which may, like strategic nuclear weapons, require the direct command and control of the Central Military Commission. In an exercise of the same year, which simulated a Soviet armoured invasion, the PLA ground force and the Second Artillery jointly repelled the Soviet attack by using tactical nuclear explosives. A Ningxia Daily article said, “Our troops’ nuclear strike capability zeroed in on the targets, took the enemy by surprise and dealt his artillery positions and reserve forces a crushing blow. The exercise was characterized as implementing our army’s new task in organizing training under modern conditions.” This was perhaps the first time that the PLA acknowledged manoeuvres involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons. In 1988, the Chinese tested a 1-5 kiloton nuclear device with an enhanced radiation yield, advancing its development of a very low yield neutron weapon. 後冷戰時期的發展 Development in the post Cold-War period 自1990年代後，中共更積極展露對提昇戰術性核武性能的興趣，並將此視為「軍事事務革命」的一部份。雖然在數量上，中共似乎無意增加其現有150枚戰術性核武的數目，不過中共對於研發戰術性核飛彈的興趣卻持續增加。近年來共軍特別著重戰術性遠攻核飛彈，尤其是攻陸巡弋飛彈及短程彈道飛彈的發展與運用。在攻陸巡弋飛彈方面，根據石明楷(Mark Stokes)的說法，中共第一代的攻陸巡弋飛彈比起其戰區彈道飛彈，精確度已可達2倍以上。中共軍方對於全球定位系統、自產及外購遙感資料庫，以及數位製圖技術的有效運用，使得攻陸巡弋飛彈的圓周誤差可達到16公尺以內。在製造成本上，研製攻陸巡弋飛彈較諸彈道飛彈更為經濟，單件成本往往僅需後者的三分之一。[19] 在實際運用及部署上，為因應後冷戰時期的戰略要求，中共的攻陸巡弋飛彈雖多配載傳統彈頭。但在技術上，若欲短期間將其改為攜帶核彈頭亦不是問題。[20] 另外一項資料則認為，中共第一代的攻陸巡弋飛彈可能都是空射型，但是否配備核彈頭則不得而知。第二代攻陸巡弋飛彈可能同時肩負戰術與戰略性功能，且均具有攜帶核彈頭的能力。[21] From the 1990s, the Chinese took the development of tactical nuclear weapons as a part of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), although they had no plans to increase their stockpile of 150 tactical nuclear weapons. China particularly demonstrated enormous interest in stand-off weapons such as land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) and short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) for a tactical nuclear role. According to Mark Stokes, “China’s first-generation LACM is likely to be up to twice as accurate as their theater ballistic missiles. Successful exploitation of GPS, indigenous and/or foreign-procured remote sensing data, and digital mapping technology could permit the fielding of an LACM with a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 16 meters or better. The LACMs are cheaper t 借貸o produce, generally thought to be one-third the cost of ballistic missiles.” There will be no technological bars to placing on these systems a nuclear payload, once developed. According to another source, the first LACMs to enter production probably would be air-launched from bombers. However, it is not clearly known whether these cruise missiles would be deployed with nuclear warheads. The second generation LACM will have both tactical and strategic attack roles and thus may be a nuclear capable system. 觀察家一般認為，鴻鳥系列巡弋飛彈是解放軍中最有可能配備戰術性核武的攻陸巡弋飛彈。根據一項國內軍方的研究，雖然中共自1970年代即已開始發展鴻鳥巡弋飛彈，不過研發過程卻十分緩慢。鴻鳥飛彈最早的代號為X-600，其發展計畫在1977年即已開始進行，小型渦輪風扇則於1985年進行測試。X-600後來更名為鴻鳥一型。該型飛彈有A（陸射型）與B（空射型）2種型式，估計可攜帶9萬噸當量的核彈頭。中共後來又持續發展了鴻鳥二型（射程1,400至1,600公里，1996年開始服役）、鴻鳥三型（射程2,500公里，仍在發展中）以及鴻鳥2000型（射程3,000至4,000公里，仍在發展中）。預計鴻鳥系列巡弋飛彈將可大幅增加中共巡弋飛彈的研發與部署能力。[22] 國外有資料估計鴻鳥系列飛彈在2005年左右可以陸續服役，不過英國倫敦國際戰略研究所(IISS)的年度《軍力平衡》(Military Balance)報告至今尚沒有鴻鳥飛彈的記錄。[23] According to a source from the Taiwanese military, the Chinese encountered difficulties in the development of the LACMs. China has devoted substantial efforts to the development of cruise missiles since the late 1970s. The nuclear capable The LACM code-named X-600 was first produced in 1977, and tested in 1985. The renamed HN-1 had two variants A (ground-launched) and B (air-launched), which were capable of carrying a 90-kiloton nuclear warhead. The later improvements of the HN-2 (range 1,400-1,600 kilometres, entered service in 1996), HN-3 (range 2,500 kilometres, developing) and HN-2000 (range 3-4,000 kilometres, developing) would progressively enhance China’s cruise missile capabilities. A foreign source suggested the HNs may enter service after 2005, but The Military Balance showed no such records. 中共另外一個戰術性核武的新焦點是短程彈道飛彈，此大概也是中共近年來飛彈發展中最具卓越成效的項目。根據美國官方資料分析，中共第一代的短程彈道飛彈在精準打擊能力上確有不足，不過後來所發展出來的短程彈道飛彈在精準度與射程上均已有相當提昇。[24] 目前被視為最可能攜帶戰術性核彈頭的是射程可達600公里的東風十五型彈道飛彈（即M-9飛彈）。雖然一般觀察家認為，絕大多數的東風十五型飛彈均配攜傳統彈頭，不過資料顯示，東風十五型飛彈亦可攜帶1萬噸當量的中子彈彈頭或2萬噸當量的核彈頭，精準度可達600公尺以內。[25] 目前中共約擁有650至730枚包括東風十五型在內的短程彈道飛彈，每年約以75至120枚的速度持續增加。[26]一些分析家認為中共很可能在必要時，會使用攜帶戰術性核彈頭的短程彈道飛彈，阻絕在對台軍事行動中前來援助的美國或日本部隊。[27] 不過同樣地，如果在敵方沒有率先使用核武的情況下，中共動用了戰術性核武，則這樣一來也就會違 G2000反了中共不首先使用核武之承諾。[28] Another new focus is the SRBM, in which the Chinese have made significant progress. The US regarded China’s first generation SRBMs do not possess a true precision strike capability, but later generations could have greater ranges and improved accuracy. The DF-15 (M-9) is currently viewed as the most likely missile that is capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads with a range of 600 kilometers. Although most of them are believed to carry conventional warheads, the DF-15 can carry a 10-kiloton neutron warhead or a 20-kiloton nuclear warhead with a CEP of 600 meters. Currently, China’s SRBM force totals some 650-730 missiles, increasing at a rate of 75 to 120 missiles per year. It is suspected that the Chinese might use nuclear-armed SRBMs to halt the US and Japanese forces during a Chinese military campaign against Taiwan, if necessary. Such controversial operations, however, could violate China’s NFU pledge, if the Chinese were forced to use tactical nuclear weapon first. 有關戰術性核武的新發展 New development related to tactical nuclear weapons 在後冷戰時期，俄羅斯部隊的大規模南侵或許不再被中共視為使用戰術性核武的主要作戰想定。不過在用途與部署上，戰術性核武仍被視為彌補傳統兵力不足之關鍵，且仍是核升級與核實戰中不可或缺的一環。也由於如此，除了一般戰術性核武的賡續發展外，中共軍方還特別著重新式核武的發展與戰術運用。雖然外界極少得知，不過中共的新發展似乎著重在縮小彈頭、研製中子彈以及利用核爆所產生的電磁脈衝及X光來製造新武器。[29] 中共對這些研究自1980年代初即已開始，不過一直要等到1980年代中期之後中共才有更多的資源挹注到這些新研究當中。即使如此，在一些間接的幫助下，中共在這幾方面都已經獲得了一些成果。 In the post-Cold War period, the massive southbound invasion of the Russian troops is perhaps no longer deemed by the Chinese as a likely scenario to use tactical nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, tactical nuclear weapons are still to be used and deployed in order to compensate the insufficiency of China’s conventional capability, and such weapons are taken as an essential part of nuclear escalation as well as nuclear war-fighting. In view of this, therefore, the Chinese continued developing tactical nuclear weapons above mentioned, and meanwhile began the development of new generation nuclear weapons for tactical use. Despite little disclosure, China’s new generation research was aimed at upgrading warheads and developing neutron bombs, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and X-ray laser weapons pumped by a nuclear explosion. The initial interest appeared in the early 1980s, but it was only since the mid-1980s that the Chinese had poured more resource into these new fields. With the help of indirect assistance, however, they seemingly had already obtained some results. 在這些有關戰術性核武的新發展當中，中子彈的研製是最值得注意的。根據八一電台在1982年2月的一項報導，國防科工委所屬的某研究機?西裝c已經完成發展中子彈相關資料的研究。[30] 之後有關中子彈的測試消息就少有傳出。不過當1999年美國國會發表著名的《考克斯報告》(Cox Report)後，中共政府立刻出人意料地宣稱他們早已擁有足夠的技術自行研製中子彈及小型戰術性核武。在同一份聲明中，中共還指稱他們早已在1988年就已經試爆了第一枚中子彈。[31] 《考克斯報告》認為，中共研製中子彈的原始目的應該是為了在其領土內遏制南侵的蘇聯裝甲部隊，不過該報告研判中子彈也可能在中共對台行動中被用來做戰術性運用，藉以減少對敵方建物與裝備之損毀與破壞。[32] Among those new developments, the neutron bomb is the most noticeable. The Bayi Radio reported that in February 1982, a research institute under the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) had completed a study of data on the development of the neutron bomb. Further tests of neutron bombs were seldom mentioned, but in 1999, when the American Cox Report was released, the Chinese Government unexpectedly announced it possessed sufficient technology to produce neutron bombs as well as small tactical nuclear weapons. The Chinese also claimed in the same statement that they had successfully tested a neutron bomb in 1988. The Cox Report judged that China probably originally developed the neutron bomb for use on its own territory against the invading Soviet forces. Such weapons could also be tactically useful in a campaign against Taiwan to reduce physical damage. 除了中子彈外，中共也持續進行核彈頭縮小與升級之相關研究。在1996年正式簽署全面禁止核試爆條約之前，中共業已進行了一系列的新式核裝置，尤其是低當量核彈頭的試爆。舉例而言，自1992年9月28日至1996年7月29日間（中共於1996年7月30日宣佈不再進行核試爆），中共至少進行了8次低當量核裝置的地下測試。對照這些測試的結果與相對應的彈頭與飛彈資料，很明顯地，中共這些核試爆主要目的就是在為新一代的戰術性核武發展更小更輕的核彈頭。[33] In addition to the neutron bomb, reducing and upgrading the warhead size were important tasks for Chinese nuclear scientists in order to use these warheads in tactical nuclear delivery systems. During the l990s, China was working to complete tests of its modern thermonuclear weapons before it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. For example, from September 28, 1992 to July 29, 1996, the Chinese at least had conducted 8 underground tests. All were low yield nuclear devices. Based on what was known about Chinese nuclear testing practices, combined with data on Chinese warhead yield and missile development, it was clear that the main purpose of these tests was to develop smaller and lighter warheads for China’s new tactical nuclear forces. 此外，根據美國國防部2005年對中共軍力的年度報告，中共很可能會在對台軍事行動中利用高空核爆所產生的高空電磁脈衝來達到先期作戰的戰術性目的。高空電磁脈衝會造成高空大氣層的離子化，並大幅減弱敵方的作戰能力，尤其會造成通訊系統連接、雷達資料傳送以及電子光學偵測器的破壞。除軍事設備之外，民用的電力與運輸系統也可能會遭到中斷。在本質?21世紀房屋仲介W，中共認為高空電磁脈衝雖為一種非傳統武器，不過此種武器並未越過核門檻，也不應該被美國或其他國家視為戰略性核武，勉強僅可被視為一種戰術性核武。不過美國卻不認為中共對此種高空核爆的使用能真如其宣稱可「戰術性」地限於台灣及台海地區。高空核爆所產生的電磁脈衝不僅會影響到台灣地區，還會影響到中國大陸本身、日本、菲律賓以及附近海域，同時影響此區域的海空運輸與交通。[34] Moreover, according to the 2005 report on China’s military power by the US Department of Defense (DoD), China would consider using a high-altitude nuclear burst to generate high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) in order to meet tactical objectives at the first stage of its military campaign against Taiwan. HEMP causes a substantial change in the ionization of the upper atmosphere, including the ionosphere and magnetosphere. These effects likely would result in the degradation of important war fighting capabilities, such as key communication links, radar transmissions, and the full spectrum of electro-optic sensors. Additional effects could include severe disruptions to civil electric/power and transportation. The Chinese might consider using HEMP as an unconventional attack, or at most a tactical nuclear weapon, and believe the US and other nations would not interpret it as a use of strategic nuclear weapons or as crossing the nuclear threshold. The DoD, however, argued that the effects of HEMP cannot be localized to Taiwan, as claimed by the Chinese, and would likely affect the mainland China, Japan, the Philippines, and commercial shipping and air routes in the region. 結語 Conclusion 就中共的觀點來看，戰術性核武不似戰略性核武那樣具有政治性，其發展戰術性核武的目的就是為了要彌補傳統戰力的不足並投入核實戰使用。在冷戰時期是為了阻擋由北方南下的大規模蘇聯地面裝甲部隊；在蘇聯解體後，戰術性核武亦被視為在攻台軍事行動中，可以有效嚇阻美、日的優勢傳統兵力。由此觀之，戰術性核武對中共而言決不是最後法寶，而是可以在大規模軍事行動中，用以對付其他強權在對於中共重大國家利益，尤其是國家主權干涉時所積極使用的武器。也由於戰術性核武這種積極性與主動使用性，中共用以做為國際宣傳的「不首先使用核武」的口號其實在本質上根本不適用於戰術性核武的使用。此種軍事運用與政治宣傳的矛盾也使得中共極少在公開場合提及其戰術性核武，更遑論其使用與部署了。 In terms of tactical nuclear weapons, the Chinese did not emphasize them politically in contrast to strategic nuclear weapons, and available evidence shows that the Chinese would be likely to use tactical nuclear weapons as a tool of nuclear war-fighting, compensating China’s inferior conventional forces. In the Cold War, tactical nuclear weapons were prepared against massive conventional attacks by the Russians, if necessary. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, tactical nuclear weapons would be used to halt the superior American or Japanese troops if they involved in China’s military campaign against Taiwan. Apparently, as far as the Chinese were concerned, tactical nuclea 房屋買賣r weapons were by no means the last resort. They can be actively employed in the massive military conflicts concerning China’s vital national interest, especially territorial sovereignty, against superior conventional forces of other military powers. Due to such an active function, China’s NFU commitment actually is not applied to tactical nuclear weapons. Unsurprisingly, this contradiction between military use and political propaganda also made China rarely mention about its tactical nuclear weapons, let along their use and deployment. 經過數十年的發展，中共的戰術性核武已從1960年代末期的原子榴彈炮、爆破地雷以及其他小型核爆破裝置發展到現在以中、短程戰術巡弋或核彈道飛彈為主要威懾能量。中共為了強化戰術性核武的實戰功能，除了賡續提升飛彈本身性能，包括精確度與射程之外，戰術性核彈頭亦一直往小型化、輕便化的方向持續發展。此外，中共也刻意發展中子彈與核爆電磁脈衝技術。這些發展雖然不必然被歸類於傳統戰術性核武的範圍之內，但其心理威懾與實戰功能卻並未大異於戰術性核武。也因此，雖然中共目前僅維持150枚戰術性核武的數目，短期似乎也沒有大幅擴充的計畫，不過其戰術性核武在質方面的不斷提昇卻是吾人所必須嚴重關注的，特別是種種跡象已顯示中共很可能在對台軍事行動中使用戰術性核武。 After decades of development, China’s tactical nuclear arsenal has been expanded from the atomic artillery shells, demolition mines and other small nuclear explosives to medium/ short range nuclear capable cruise or ballistic missiles which are now China’s major tactical nuclear deterrent. In order to enhance war-fighting capabilities, the Chinese have continuously improved the performance of nuclear missiles, including their CEPs and ranges. Meanwhile, the development to reduce the sizes and weights of nuclear warheads continues. Moreover, China had put much resource on technologies of the neutron bomb and EMP generated by nuclear burst. Such weapons are not necessarily classified as tactical nuclear weapons by traditional definition. However, the military functions of psychological intimidation produced by such weapons are literally the same, if not more than, ordinary tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, even though the Chinese currently remain their tactical nuclear stockpile of about 150 weapons, and seemingly have no plans to drastically expand their tactical nuclear arsenal, the significant promotion of quality of their tactical nuclear weapons cannot be underestimated, especially evidence has shown that China’s tactical nuclear weapons could be very likely used in the military operations against Taiwan in the future. 作者簡介 鄭大誠博士，國立臺灣大學政治學學士、英國約克大學(University of York)政治學碩士、英國赫爾大學(University of Hull)政治學博士，現為獨立國防與戰略問題分析員。 Dr Ta-chen Cheng was educated in the National Taiwan University, the University of York, and received his doctorate from the University of Hull. He is currently an independent defence analyst. 找房子  .